Hoch v. Vance Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 39788 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-17-2013
Hoch v. Vance Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39788
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"Hoch v. Vance Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39788" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 652.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/652
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JOHN M. HOCH and CAROLED. HOCH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiff's-Respondents, 
vs. 
ROB VANCE and BECKY VANCE, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
JAKE SWEET and AUDREY SWEET, 




) SUPREME COURT 


















Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
for Nez Perce County 
Honorable Jeff Brudie, District Judge Presiding 
Counsel for Appellant 
W. Jeremy Carr, ISB # 6927 
1229 Main Street, P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-9516 
Counsel for Respondents 
Theodore 0. Creason, ISB #1563 
1219 Idaho Street, P.O. Drawer 835 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
(208) 743-1516 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................... i 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1 
ST A TEMENT OF TfIE CASE ....................................................................................................... 1 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE ................................................................................................... 1 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS .......................................................................................... .2 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................. 2 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 5 
A. STAJ\!DARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................................. 7 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE TRANSFER 
INSTRUMENT UNAMBIGLJOlJS ..................................................................................... 8 
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE EASEMENTS 
RESERVED BY CRlDLEBAUGH WERE APPURTENANT EASEMENTS ................ 12 
CONCLLJSION ............................................................................................................................. 17 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 210 P.3d 75 (2009) ......................................................... 11 
Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000) ................................................................... 7 
Becksteadv. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 190 P.3d 876 (2008) ............................................................... 15 
Bothwell v. Keefer, 53 Idaho 658, 27 P.2d 65 (1933) ................................................................... 16 
Boydstun Beach Ass 'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 3 70, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1986) ........................... 15 
Cannon v. Pen~y, J 44 Idaho 728, 170 P .3d 393 (2007) .................................................................. 9 
Hadfieldv. State ex rel. Burns, 86 Idaho 561, 388 P.2d 1018 (1963) .......................................... 15 
Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 76 P.3d 969 (2003) ........................................................ 6, 13, 14 
Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1, 156 P.3d 502 (2007) .................................... 16 
Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 673 P.2d 1048 (1983) .............................................................. 9 
Lewiston Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Lewiston, 151 Idaho 800, 264 P.3d 907 (2011) ....... 16 
Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 65 P.3d 525 (2003) .............................................................. 6, 8, 9 
Phillips Indus., Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 827 P.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1992) ........................ 8, 12 
Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497, 112 P.3d 785 (2005) .................................................................... 8 
Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 133 P.3d 1232 (2006) ............................................................ 7 
Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 554 P.2d 948 (1976) .................................................................... 11 
Snake River Equip. Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 691P.2d787 (1984) ............................... 8 
Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 152 P.3d 581 (2007) .................................... 14 
Vil!. of Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749, 95 P. 945 (1908) ........................................................ 15 
Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 923 P .2d 416 (1996) ....................................... 7 
Statutes 
Idaho Code § 55-601 ..................................................................................................................... 12 
Idaho Code§ 9-505 ....................................................................................................................... 12 
-1-
Other Authorities 
25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses§ 10 ............................................................................... 14 
81 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 199 (2009) .................................................................................... 16 
Rules 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c) ..................................................................................................................... 7 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e) ................................................................................................................. 7, 8 
-11-
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The district court did not err in its summary judgment ruling. 
The relevant deed language is unambiguous. Jack Cridlebaugh sold "all of his interest," 
in the property now owned by John and Carol Hoch, to the Hochs. He expressly included in that 
general grant easement rights he had reserved in earlier conveyances to Rob and Becky Vance 
and Jake and Audrey Sweet. The easement rights he reserved were rights to ingress and egress 
over routes providing access to the Vances' property and the Sweets' property from a public 
right-of-way, as well as all other roads existing on the several properties at the time of 
conveyance. The language of Cridlebaugh's reservations and subsequent conveyance is 
unambiguous. 
The easements reserved by Cridlebaugh and subsequently transferred to Hochs were 
appurtenant easements. First, the law presumes the easements to be appurtenant. Second, the 
nature of these easements is appurtenant-the easements benefit the dominant estate by 
providing a means of ingress and egress. 
Hochs ask that the Court affirm the district court 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Hochs dispute Vances' description of the breadth of the district court's smnmary 
judgment ruling. The sole issue decided at summary judgment was that Hochs held an 
appurtenant easement over the upper road. The court interpreted the relevant provisions of the 
transfer instruments and found the easement over the upper road properly reserved by specific 
reservation language and a catch-all provision. The summary judgment decision reserved all 
other issues, without limitation, for determination at trial. 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Hochs agree with the Vances' description of the Course of Proceedings. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Vances' description of facts relies upon findings issued by the trial court. The trial 
court's findings of fact were issued over two years after the grant of summary judgment and are 
the product of the court's review of the evidence and argument submitted during the trial on this 
matter. Vances, however, have not argued on appeal any error on the part of the trial court. Nor 
have Vances challenged any of the factual findings of the district court in its summary judgment 
ruling. Therefore, while many of the findings made by the trial court are identical to those 
established at the summary judgment hearing, 1 this Court should confine its review of the district 
court's grant of summary judgment to those facts before it at the time of summary judgment. 
The following facts were established at summary judgment: 
Jack Cridlebaugh was the owner of 90 acres of real property in the Waha region of 
fdaho.2 Jn 2000, Cridlebaugh subdivided the property into several parcels.3 Three of the parcels 
were sold over the course of three years: Rob and Becky Vance purchased 20 acres on October 
12, 2000, Jake and Audrey Sweet purchased 40 acres on October 10, 2001, and John and Carole 
Hoch purchased 20 acres on March 26, 2002 (hereinafter referred to, respectively, as "Vance 
property", "Sweet property'', and "Hoch property").4 Cridlebaugh made each of these 
1 One notable exception is that Hochs dispute the trial court's finding that the Hoehs did not 
believe they had acquired an easement over the upper road at the time of conveyance. R. Vol. lI, 
~· 388-89. 




conveyances by warranty deed (hereinafter referred to, respectively, as "Vance Deed", "Sweet 
Deed", and "Hoch Deed").5 Cridlebaugh retained ownership of the remaining 10 acres.6,7 
In conveying the three parcels, Cridlebaugh granted and reserved several easements over 
each piece of property. Before proceeding to the language of those easements, it is important the 
Court understand the roads existing on the property. At all relevant times, the Vance property, 
the Sweet property and the Hoch property have all been accessible by two access easements, 
known as the upper road and the lower road.8 The upper road and the lower road run from 
Stagecoach Road, a public right-of-way to the Vance property, Sweet property, and Hoch 
property.9 On Exhibit 8 of the Clerk's Record ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5"), Stagecoach Road can 
be seen running in a northerly direction on the bottom right-hand corner of the exhibit, thence in 
a northwesterly direction to the middle of the top edge of the exhibit. Though "upper road" and 
"lower road" were, at one point, descriptive terms, they have become proper nouns for purposes 
of this litigation. The lower road intersects with Stagecoach Road near the top of the exhibit and 
runs to the west. There is no dispute regarding the lower road. 
The upper road intersects Stagecoach Road at two points. The upper road runs westerly 
from an intersection point on the bottom right-hand corner of Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5, through the 
parcel labeled "Houghton", through the parcel labeled "Weinert", through the ten acres retained 
by Cridlebaugh, through the Sweet property, across a corner of the Vance Property and to the 
s Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Though much of the detail found in the aerial photographs has been degraded upon 
photocopying, the Court may be assisted by a review of the aerial photograph used as an 
illustrative exhibit, found at R. Exh. 3 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #1"), and the aerial photograph with a 
parcel overlay, found at R. Exh. 8 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5"). 
8 R. Vol. II, p. 291. 
9 Id. 
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Hoch property. 10 The upper road then comes back in an easterly direction through the Vance 
property, through the parcel labeled "McKenna" and intersects with Stagecoach Road at an 
intersection point on the top-middle of Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5. 11 Thus, the upper road makes a 
loop through the properties.12 The northern half of that loop (that portion running west from the 
Hoch property to Stagecoach Road) is what has been referred to by the paiiies as "Buckboard 
Lane."13 The pa11ies that Cridlebaugh held an easement over the entire upper road except 
that portion traversing the McKenna property. 
In the Hoch Deed, 14 Cridlebaugh conveyed "all of his interest" in the Hoch prope11y, 
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth 
in the following easements: 
* * * 
5) Easement for the purpose of ingress and and rights incidental 
thereto as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument 
No. 657867, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. [Vance Deed] 
6) Easement for the purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental 
thereto as reserved in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument 
No. 668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho. [Sweet Deed] 
* * * 
Thus, the Hoch Deed incorporates by reference the easements reserved in the Vance Deed and 
the Sweet Deed. The language of the easement reservation made by Cridlebaugh in the Vance 
Decd15 and Sweet Deed16 is identical: 
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for 
ingress and running from the public right of way to the above described 
property which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an easement 
10 Compare R. Vol. II, p. 292 with R. Exh. 8 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5"). 
II Id. 
p 
~ R. Vol. II, p. 292 
13 Id. 
14 R. Exh. No. 39 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #107"). 
15 R. Exh. No. 37 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #105"). 
16 R. Exh. No. 38 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #106"). 
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over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein being 
conveyed. 
At the summary judgment hearing, the parties agreed that by this language Cridlebaugh reserved, 
at very least, an easement over the upper road from his retained property to the Hoch property. 17 
The issue before the district court on summary judgment was whether the Hoch Deed 
effected the transfer from Cridlebaugh to Hochs of an appurtenant easement for ingress and 
egress across the upper road. The district court found that it did. 
ARGUMENT 
The district court did not err in its summary judgment ruling that the Hoch Deed 
unambiguously transferred an access easement to the Hoch property over the upper road. The 
district court found that Cridlebaugh reserved an easement for ingress and egress over the upper 
road with a specific reservation over that roadway, followed by a general catch-all reservation 
over all roadways existing at the time of his reservation. R. Vol. II, p. 295. The district court 
ruled that Cridlcbaugh then transferred that easement right to Hochs when he deeded them "all of 
his interest" in the Hoch property, explicitly including his reservation across the upper road and 
all roadways. Id. 
Vances challenge the district court's finding that the language reserving the easement is 
unambiguous and the district court's interpretation of the nature of the easements reserved by 
Crid lebaugh. Vances ask this Court to hold the relevant language of the transfer instrument 
ambiguous, despite the instrument's use of historic, common and customary language in the 
practice of real property transfers. Vances invite the Court to speculate as to how Cridlebaugh 
may have intended common language to hold a different meaning. Vances provide no 
17 R. Vol. II, p. 292. 
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explanation for how the plain language of Cridlebaugh' s reservation could be interpreted in any 
manner other than to effoct a reservation of an easement right across the access roads to the 
property as well as all roads existing on the property at the time of reservation. Thus, Vances fail 
to set forth a reasonable interpretation of the Hoch deed that is alternative to that found by the 
district court. Therefore, the Court should deny Vances' request for reversal on the issue of 
ambiguity. See Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508, 65 P.3d 525, 530 (2003). 
Vances challenge the district court's holding that Cridlebaugh reserved an appurtenant 
easement over the upper road, and challenge the district court's finding that Cridlebaugh also 
reserved an easement over all roads existing on the property at the time of reservation. Vances 
argue that the easement reservation created in gross easements rather than appurtenant 
easements. To prevail on this argument, Vances must overcome the presumption that easements 
are appurtenant. See Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 230, 76 P.3d 969, 974 (2003). Vances 
attempt to support their argument, not by challenging the appurtenant nature of the upper road, 
but by challenging the appurtenant nature of Buckboard Lane-a road over which the Hochs 
were adjudicated to hold an easement right at the subsequent trial. Vances claim that because 
Cridlebaugh could not provide Hochs with legal access over Buckboard Lane all the way to a 
public right-of-way, 18 the route cannot be held to benefit the dominant estate. Vances fail to 
provide any legal authority supporting the proposition that an easement for ingress and egress 
only benefits the dominant estate when it runs all the way to a public right-of-way. Therefore, 
Vances have failed to present an alternative reasonable interpretation to the language of the Hoch 
Deed. The judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
18 As recognized by the trial court, Cridlebaugh could not provide I-lochs with an easement over 
the entirety of Buckboard Lane, only that part of the road which existed on his property at the 
time of the Vance Deed. 
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A. STANDARD OFREVIE\V 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor ofHochs "as to the existence of an 
appurtenant easement on the upper road." R. Vol. ll, p. 297. The court based its judgment, in 
part, on findings that (1) the relevant transfer instruments were unambiguous with regard to the 
easement; and (2) there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of the 
upper road at all relevant times. "The standard of review on appeal from an order granting 
summary judgment is the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion 
for summary judgment." Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 770, 133 P.3d 1232, 1235 (2006). 
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and discovery 
documents before the court show that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the requested 
judgment. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 
(2000). The moving party carries the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. Baxter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P.3d at 267. Here, Hochs requested the district court 
find that Hochs held an appurtenant easement over the upper road by way of the deed from 
Cridlebaugh. In support of their motion, Hochs offered (1) the transfor instruments from 
Cridlebaugh to Vances, Sweets. and Hochs; (2) Cridlebaugh's deposition testimony regarding 
the state of his property prior to any of the transfers; and (3) an aerial photograph of the property. 
In opposing Hochs' motion, the Vances could "not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of [their] pleadings." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e). Once the moving party has shown the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish 
an issue of fact regarding that element. Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 923 
P.2d 416 (1996). The Vances were required to respond "by affidavits or as otherwise provided 
in [Rule 56], ... set[ting] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." 
-7-
Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e). The Vances offered additional excerpts from the Cridlebaugh deposition 
and an affidavit of Becky Vance. The district court also had before it an affidavit of Jake Sweet. 
By these documents, as well as the pleadings on record, Vances sought to show a genuine issue 
of material fact regarding whether the Hochs held an appurtenant easement over the upper road. 
However, "[ c ]reating only a slight doubt as to the facts will not defeat a summary judgment 
motion; a summary judgment will be granted whenever on the basis of the evidence before the 
cou1i a directed verdict would be warranted or whenever reasonable minds could not disagree as 
to the facts." Snake River Equip. Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 549, 691 P.2d 787, 795 
(1984). 
Therefore, this Comi must determine whether the trial court erred in finding, based upon 
the record provided to it by the parties, that reasonable minds could not disagree as to those facts 
material to a determination on the question of whether Hochs' held an appurtenant easement over 
the upper road. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE TRANSFER 
INSTRUMENT UNAMBIGUOUS. 
The Corni begins the interpretation and construction of a deed by first detennining 
whether the document is ambiguous. See Phillips Indus., Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 697, 
827 P.2d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 1992). The answer to this threshold inquiry dictates the proper 
scope of the Court's inquiry into the pa1iies' intent. Id. "If the instrument is unambiguous, its 
terms are settled as a matter of law using the plain language of the document." Read v. Harvey, 
141 Idaho 497, 499, 112 P.3d 785, 787 (2005). "Interpretation of an ambiguous deed is a 
question of fact to be settled by the language in the conveyance instrument and the facts and 
circumstances of the transaction." Neider, 138 Idaho at 508, 65 P.3d at 530. "Whether a 
-8-
contract is ambiguous is a question of law." Cannon v. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 731, 170 P.3d 393, 
396 (2007). 
"Ambiguity exists only if language of the conveyance instrument is subject to conflicting 
interpretations." Neider, 138 ldaho at 508, 65 P.3d at 530. Those conflicting interpretations 
must be reasonable. See Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 858, 673 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1983). 
Here, the relevant text includes the Hoch Deed as well as incorporated portions of the Vance 
Deed and the Sweet Deed. 
In the Hoch Deed, Cridlebaugh transferred to Hochs "all interest in the ... described 
premises" "TOGETHER WITH the rights and responsibilities set forth in the following 
easements:" 
5) Easement for purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in document recorded October 16, 2000 as Instrument No. 657867, 
records of Nez Perce County, Idaho [Vance Deed]. 
6) Easement for purpose of ingress and egress and rights incidental thereto as 
set forth in a Warranty Deed recorded October 10, 2001 as Instrument No. 
668025, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho [Sweet Deed]. 
R. Exh. No. 39 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #107"). The language of the conveyance instrument is 
unambiguous: Cridlebaugh transferred to Hochs the premises together with the ingress and 
egress easements he reserved for himself in the Vance Deed and the Sweet Deed. The Vance 
Deed and the Sweet Deed contain the following easement reservation: 
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for 
ingress and egress running from the public right-of-way to the above described 
real property which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an 
easement over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein 
being conveyed. 
R. Exh. No. 37 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #105") & R. Exh. No. 38 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #106"). The 
language of this reservation is unambiguous: Cridlebaugh made a specific easement reservation 
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over those roads which ran from the public right-of-way to the Vance and Sweet properties, and 
then made a general reservation over all roadways existing on the Vance and Sweet properties at 
the time of conveyance. 
Vances ask the Court to find ambiguity based upon (1) use of the term "roadways" in the 
Vance Deed and Sweet Deed; and (2) use of "easement" in the singular in the Hoch Deed. App. 
Br. 16-17. 
( 1) Vances argue that ambiguity exists because "[i]t is impossible to determine what 
'roadways' the grantor was trying to convey an easement across from the documents 
themselves." App. Br. 16. The language of the instruments belies this argument; Cridlebaugh 
reserved and easement over "all roadways" existing at the time of transfer. There is no 
reasonable basis for interpreting this language to mean that Cridlebaugh only intended to reserve 
an easement over certain roadways and was disclaiming any easement over other roadways. 
Vances base the entirety of their argument upon a factual dispute regarding what roadways were 
in existence at the relevant time. A factual dispute as to the existence of a roadway does not 
render ambiguous Cridlebaugh's reservation of an easement across routes providing access to a 
public right of way, together with any existing roadway. 
(2) Vances argue ambiguity exists because Cridlebaugh reserved "all easements for 
ingress and egress ... together with an easement over and across all roadways" in the Vance 
Deed and Sweet Deed, but transferred to Hochs only the "easement" reserved in the respective 
deeds. App. Br. 17-18. Based on this language, Vances contend that an alternative reasonable 
interpretation of the deed from Cridlebaugh to Hoch is that Cridlebaugh only intended to give an 
easement over a single road, not all roadways. Id. This argument is unpersuasive. An easement 
is a description of a property right, not a description of the property. See, e.g., Backman v. 
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Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 394, 210 P.3d 75, 79 (2009); Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 
P.2d 948, 951 (1976). Thus, Cridlebaugh could rightly reserve an easement over all roadways 
providing access to a public right-of-way and all other roadways existing at the time of 
conveyance. He could (and did) then transfer that easement right to the Hochs. There exists no 
foundation in the Hoch Deed or the incorporated provisions of the Vance Deed and Sweet Deed 
supporting an interpretation that Cridlebaugh intended to transfer Hochs anything less than the 
entirety of the easement right he reserved in the Vance Deed and Sweet Deed. 
Vances have confined their challenge to the district court's grant at summary judgment. 
The question at the summary judgment proceeding was whether the relevant text was ambiguous 
in its application to the upper road. Prior to the grant of summary judgment, the district court 
was presented with the following facts: 
(a) the upper road existed at all relevant times, 1 R. Vol. II, p. 291-92; 
(b) the upper road provided a route for ingress and egress running from Stagecoach 
Road, a public right-of-way, through the property retained by Cridlebaugh, 
through the Sweet property, through the Vance property, and to the Hoch 
property, R. Vol. If, p. 291-92; 
(c) Cridlebaugh reserved an easement over the upper road running from his retained 
property to the Hoch property, R. Vol. II, p. 292, L 17-20; and 
(d) Cridlebaugh transferred his interest in the Hoch property to the Hochs by means 
of the Hoch Deed, R. Vol. II, p. 291. 
--·--····--------
19 Vances (and Sweets) disputed the nature and existence of the upper road at summary 
judgment. After a review of the admissible evidence submitted by the parties, the district court 
ruled that reasonable minds could not disagree as to the fact that the upper road was in existence 
at all relevant times. See R. Vol. II, p. 294. Vances' Opening Brief does not challenge the 
district court's finding. 
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Those undisputed faets compelled the court's finding that Hochs held an easement over the upper 
road. Cridlebaugh retained an easement for ingress and egress in his transfers to V ances and 
Sweets. In so doing, Cridlebaugh reserved access to the Hoch prope1ty over the upper road. 
Cridlebaugh transferred the entirety of his interest to the Hochs, expressly including the retained 
easement. Therefore, Hochs obtained an easement over the upper road. 
Vances ask the Court to read ambiguity into transfer that is of a historic, 
common and customary use in the transfer of real prope1ty. Rather than offer a reasonable 
alternative interpretation to the plain language of the text, Vances invite the Court to speculate as 
to ways in which the grantor may have misunderstood the effect of the deed. Vances' argument 
finds no support in the established principles interpreting real property instruments. Transfers in 
real prope1ty are made by instruments in writing. Idaho Code § 9-505 & § 55-601. As a general 
rule, the Courts assume that the parties mean exactly what they wrote. Phillips, 121 Idaho at 
697, 827 P.2d at 710. That principle renders instruments reliable to both third parties, as well as 
to the grantor and grantee. If the language challenged here renders a transfer instrument 
ambiguous, the parol evidence rule will be relegated to the exception rather than the rule. See id. 
The Court should, therefore, limit inquiry regarding the parties' intent to the four comers of the 
deed. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE EASEMENTS 
RESERVED BY CRIDLEBAUGH WERE APPURTENANT EASEMENTS. 
Vances argue that the Court erred (1) by not confining the nature of the easement held by 
Hochs across the upper road to existing for the purpose of ingress and egress, App. Br. 13; and 
(2) by ruling that Cridlebaugh reserved an appurtenant easement rather than an easement in 
gross, App. Br. 14. The district court did not err on either count. First, the limitation of Hochs' 
12-
easement to being for the purposes of ingress and egress has never been in dispute. Second, the 
manner of creation of the easement over the upper road and the purpose that easement 
establish its nature as an appurtenant easement. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d at 974. 
Vances first ask this Court to reverse the grant of summary judgment because the district 
court did not limit the Hochs' easement over the upper road to and Vances 
request for relief on this point is perplexing because (1) the language the summary judgment 
ruling makes clear the district court considered Hochs' easement to be for the purposes of ingress 
and cgress,20 and in any event, the district comi expressly reserved ruling on the scope of the 
easement for trial, R. Vol. II, p. 297; (2) Hochs have never claimed that the easement on the 
upper road is for anything other than ingress and egress; and (3) the judgment limits the scope of 
Hochs' easement over the upper road to ingress and egress, R. Vol. II, p. 412. lfochs have never 
disputed--and do not now dispute-that limitation. 
Vances next claim that the district court erred in ruling that Cridlebaugh reserved an 
appurtenant easement. "There are two general types of easements: easements appurtenant and 
easements in gross. An appurtenant easement is a right to use a certain parcel, the servient 
estate, for the benefit of another parcel, the dominant estate." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 
P.3d at 974. "In contrast, an easement in benefits the holder of the easement personally, 
without connection to the ownership or use of a specific parcel of land." Id. "Where the owner 
of the dominant estate is selling the property to be subjected to the servitude, an express 
easement may be created by reservation or by exception." Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 
20 The district court concluded "that the upper road easement Mr. Cridlebaugh created and 
reserved for himself and his heirs and assigns was conveyed to the I-lochs ... where he conveyed 
ingress and easement that he had reserved in the Sweet deed," R. Vol. II, p. 295. 
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143 Idaho 710, 714, 152 P.3d 581, 585 (2007). Cridlebaugh created the easements he held over 
the Vance and Sweet properties by reservation: 
RESERVING UNTO THE GRANTOR, his heirs and assigns, all easements for 
and egress running from the public right-of-way to the above described 
real property which are appurtenances to said real property, together with an 
easement over and across all roadways presently existing on the property herein 
being conveyed. 
The district court found that by this reservation Mr. Cridlebaugh created an access easement over 
the upper road. "He then reserved to himself, his heirs and assigns all existing easements, of 
which [the access easement] was one." R. Vol. IL p. 
There exists no particular form or words necessary for the creation of an appurtenant 
easement. See Tower Asset, 143 Idaho at 714, 152 P.3d at 585. "[WJhether an easement is 
apputienant or in gross is to be determined by a fair interpretation of the grant or reservation 
creating the easement, aided, if necessary, by the situation of the property and the surrounding 
circumstances." 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 10 (footnote omitted). "In cases of 
doubt, Idaho courts presume the easement is appurtenant." Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 230, 76 P.3d 
at 974. Here, both the language and the surrounding circumstances support a finding that 
Cridlebaugh's reservation of an easement over the upper road was an appurtenant easement. 
The language of the reservation supports a finding that Cridlebaugh created an 
appurtenant easement. Cridlebaugh not only reserved an easement for himself, as granter, but 
also for "his heirs and assigns". A reservation in favor of the grantor's heirs and assigns 
demonstrates the appm1enant nature of the easement because the phrase '"generally 
comprehends all those who take either immediately or remotely from or under the assignor, 
whether by conveyance, devise, descent, or act of law."' Boydstun Beach Ass 'n v. Allen, 111 
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Idaho 370, 375, 723 P.2d 914, 919 (Ct. App. 1986) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 109 (5th ed. 
1979)). 
The nature of the easement also supports a finding that the easement over the upper road 
is appurtenant to the Hoch property. As set forth above, the district court found that reasonable 
minds could not disagree as to the fact that the upper road was a route for ingress and egress 
from Stagecoach Road to the Hoch property. A route for access to a public right-of-way is a 
benefit to the Hoch property. See also Becksteadv. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 65, 190 P.3d 876, 884 
(2008); Hadfield v. State ex rel. Burns, 86 Idaho 561, 566, 388 P.2d 1018, 1021 (1963); Vil!. of 
Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749, 95 P. 945 (1908). As the district court noted, "[i]t cannot be 
gainsaid that access to one's property enhances one's ability to use it." R. Vol. II, p. 296. 
Vances attack the district court's finding that the easement over the upper road 1s 
appurtenant by questioning the value of an easement right adjudicated at trial: the easement right 
over Buckboard Lane. App. Br. 14. Though Buckboard Lane runs from the Hoch property to 
Stagecoach Road, part of the route crosses over onto property owned by a third party, McKenna. 
Cridlebaugh never owned the McKenna property, and he did not hold an easement right over that 
portion of Buckboard Lane which runs through the McKenna property. Vances argue on appeal 
that because Cridlebaugh could not transfer an easement right on Buckboard Lane all the way to 
a public right-of-way, the Buckboard Lane easement is not a benefit to the Hoch property. 
Vances argument fails for two reasons. First, the district court did not rule upon Hochs' right to 
Buckboard Lane in its summary judgment. The sole issue upon which summary judgment was 
granted was that the Hochs held an appurtenant easement along the upper road from Stagecoach 
Road to the Hoch property. R. Vol. II, p. 297; see also R. Exh. 41 ("Plaintiffs' Exhibit #109"), p. 
46. II. 12-17 (transcript of hearing on a Motion to Show Cause, held six months after grant of 
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summary judgment, at which the district court reiterated the scope of its summary judgment 
grant). The inclusion of Buckboard Lane as a route over which Hochs held an appurtenant 
easement was not adjudicated until trial. R. Vol. IT, p. 412-13. Vances have not challenged the 
trial court's finding of an easement over Buckboard Lane in their Appellants' Brief.21 Second, 
the Vances fail to provide any authority for the proposition that an easement for ingress and 
egress is of no value to the dominant estate unless it provides access all the way to a public right-
of-way at the time of granting. "The failure to support an alleged error with argument and 
authority is deemed a waiver of the issue." Lewiston lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Lewiston, 
151Idaho800, 808, 264 P.3d 907, 915 (2011). 
Vances failed to present evidence rebutting the presumption that the easement rights 
reserved by Cridlebaugh were appurtenant to the Hoch property. The nature of the easement 
over the upper road and the language used in its creation supp011 a finding that the easement over 
the upper road was appurtenant to the property purchased by the Hochs. Therefore, the district 
court did not err in ruling that Cridlebaugh reserved an appurtenant easement over the upper 
road. By purchasing the dominant the Hochs obtained the easement. See 81 Am. 
Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 199 (2009) ("An appurtenant easement for right of way purposes passes 
with subsequent conveyances, even if the specific language of the right of way is not repeated in 
the deed."); see also Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1, 13, 156 P.3d 502, 
514 (2007); Bothwell v. Keefer, 53 Idaho 658, 27 P.2d 65, 66 (1933). Therefore, the Hochs 
acquired the easements reserved by Cridlebaugh in the Vance Deed and Sweet Deed. 
21 At trial, testimony was provided regarding the particular benefits holding an easement across 
Buckboard Lane would be to the Hoch property. Hoch testified to the benefit of his easement 
over Buckboard Lane both as an access route to Stagecoach Road and for ingress and egress 
even absent the ability to reach Stagecoach Road. 
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CONCLUSION 
Hochs ask this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
DA TED this 15th day of January, 2013. 
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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